Design of an Enlisted Assignment and Retention Marketplace
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Authors
Gates., William R.
Hatch, William D., II
Subjects
Enlisted Detailing
Enlisted Assignments
Enlisted Marketplace
Two-sided Matching
Two-sided Matching with Money
Retention Auctions
Reenlistment Bonuses
Non-monetary Retention Incentives
Enlisted Assignments
Enlisted Marketplace
Two-sided Matching
Two-sided Matching with Money
Retention Auctions
Reenlistment Bonuses
Non-monetary Retention Incentives
Advisors
Date of Issue
2024-01
Date
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The Navy’s current enlisted distribution and career management originated with a conscripted force preparing for a Major Theatre cold war. Although it has been over 40 years since the volunteer force was implemented the policies and processes have lagged significantly. The Navy faces a significantly different demographic and a stronger economy, so the incentives to enlist and reenlist must evolve.
The Navy needs a market-based retention and assignment process capable of meeting the Navy’s job, career, and quality needs, while meeting the sailors’ individual desires, preferences, and aspirations. The traditional reenlistment and assignment processes address both retention and assignment, but they face significant risk for under- or over-estimating the retention incentive needed to meet end-strength goals, are inflexible, do not reward performance, and they include at least some less than voluntary assignments.
Focusing on the enlisted Aerographer’s Mate (AG) community, this research proposes five alternatives to introduce market-based mechanisms into the enlisted detailing process, specifically three alternative auctions designs, two-sided matching, and two-sided matching with money. A basic auction offers better precision in setting retention and assignment incentives at the minimum level necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Basic auctions can incorporate adjustments for past or projected sailor performance or to include individualized non-monetary incentives to further improve performance. However, they do not specifically address the one-to-one nature of the Navy’s assignment process. Two-sided matching is specifically designed to address the assignment problem, but not retention. Two-sided matching with money addresses retention and assignment. It is the alternative that best fits the Navy’s preferences for an enlisted detailing marketplace.
Type
Technical Report
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
NPS-DDM-23-008
Sponsors
Naval Research Program (NRP); BUPERS-34B
Funder
This research is supported by funding from the Naval
Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098).
Format
97 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.