The rise of the autocratic nuclear marketplace
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Authors
Miller, Nicholas L.
Volpe, Tristan A.
Subjects
Economic statecraft
nuclear trade
nonproliferation
regime type
great power competition
nuclear trade
nonproliferation
regime type
great power competition
Advisors
Date of Issue
2022
Date
Publisher
Taylor & Francis Group
Language
Abstract
The United States established itself as the dominant supplier of civil nuclear
technology in the 1960s. But Moscow soon caught up, supplanting Washington
after the Cold War. What led to the rise of this autocratic nuclear marketplace?
We identify two factors. First, polarity shapes the motives for states to pursue
civil nuclear exports. The superpowers faced strong motivations under bipolarity, but unipolarity put greater pressure on Russia to compete for influence with
nuclear exports. Second, regime type affects state capacity to execute this
strategy. We find that Moscow enjoyed an autocratic advantage, which insulated its nuclear industry from domestic opposition.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2022.2052725
Series/Report No
Department
Defense Analysis (DA)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation G-1802-152803
CWMD Systems Office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
CWMD Systems Office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
Format
40 p.
Citation
Miller, Nicholas L., and Tristan A. Volpe. "The rise of the autocratic nuclear marketplace." Journal of Strategic Studies (2022): 1-39.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States