Beyond population engagement: understanding counterinsurgency
| dc.contributor.author | Gregg, Heather S. | |
| dc.contributor.department | Defense Analysis (DA) | |
| dc.date | Autumn 2009 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-27T15:35:35Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2013-11-27T15:35:35Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The US military has made considerable progress in developing counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and doctrine, including the publication of Army Field Manual 3-24 and the military's successes in working with the population to stem the insurgency in Iraq. The short-term goals of COIN are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their support. Whichever side wins the support of the population--either the host nation (and US forces that support it) or the insurgents--wins the battle. The battle is not the war, however. the long-term goal of a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a counterinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population engagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and less understood. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Parameters, Autumn 2009 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10945/37877 | |
| dc.subject.author | counterinsurgency | en_US |
| dc.title | Beyond population engagement: understanding counterinsurgency | en_US |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |
