THE CYBER OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE REVISITED: THE VARIABLES TIPPING THE BALANCE

Abstract

Thus far, the efforts to analyze the cyber offense-defense balance have proven unconvincing, driving the need to revisit the discussion. The problems stem from the baseline theory, as the literature suffers from excessive nuance and provides unproductive methods to assess the offense-defense balance. To address these problems, the purpose of this thesis is threefold: (1) offer a robust definition of the offense-defense theory, (2) develop variables that tip the offense-defense balance, creating an analytical framework in the process, and (3) employ that framework to assess the cyber offense-defense balance. This thesis develops a definition of the offense-defense theory that cuts the unnecessary complexity and focuses solely on the offense-defense balance. It is the balance that predicts a heightened chance of conflict, as it identifies a condition that incites aggressive behavior when actors perceive the dominance of offensive strategies. The current literature muddles this clean connection. Next, the theoretical analysis herein reveals six variables that tip the balance: the information advantage, decisive effects, exposure, insulation, criticality, and resilience. This thesis then demonstrates the explanatory power of these six variables by providing case studies in air warfare and irregular warfare. Finally, these variables facilitate an analysis of the cyber offense-defense balance, suggesting that actors perceive offensive strategies to be dominant in cyber conflict.