The effect of decoys in IED warfare
Authors
Lin, Kyle Y.
Washburn, Alan R.
Subjects
Game theory
Advisors
Date of Issue
2010
Date
2010
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This report examines two forms of decoy that may arise in warfare involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The first is a fake IED, which costs less than a real IED and wastes the time of route-clearing patrols that investigate it. The second is an understaffed surveillance tower, which may provide some deterrence to insurgent activities, as from the outside the tower appears to be fully operational. For each form of decoy, we formulate mathematical models to study the optimal strategies for both the insurgents and the government forces. We use numerical examples to demonstrate our models, and to point out the situations when these decoys may play a significant role in IED warfare.
Type
Technical Report
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research (OR)
Organization
Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences (GSOIS)
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
NPS-OR-10-007
Sponsors
Funder
Format
vi, 28 p.: ill.;28 cm.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.