Congressional Control over Defense and Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund
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Authors
Candreva, Philip J.
Jones, L.R.
Subjects
national defense budgeting
supplemental appropriations for defense
defense supplementals
civil-military relations
budgets
supplemental appropriations for defense
defense supplementals
civil-military relations
budgets
Advisors
Date of Issue
2005-10
Date
Publisher
Sage Publications
Language
Abstract
Emerging theories of civil-military relations take a more nuanced look at the role of the actors involved, particularly noting the critical role of the legislature in modern democracies. An important tool of control for the legislature is the power of the purse, so circumstances of delegated spending authority by the legislature to the military are worthy of study. This study investigates a series of supplemental appropriations enacted by the U.S. Congress to pay for the war on terrorism and situates the story in the current literature on civil-military relations. The case describes an episode in which the legislature was willing to delegate authority, how the executive responded, and the circumstances under which the legislature returned to traditional forms of oversight.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05277911
Series/Report No
Department
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
Format
18 p.
Citation
Candreva, Philip J., and L. R. Jones. "Congressional control over defense and delegation of authority in the case of the defense emergency response fund." Armed Forces & Society 32.1 (2005): 105-122.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.