YOU RECRUIT WHO YOU ARE: THE QUALITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARINE RECRUITER AND ENLISTEE
Loading...
Authors
Eliason, Brandon S.
Subjects
recruiting
Marine Corps
enlistee
recruiter
recruiting assignment
special duty assignment
SDA
HSST
MMEA-25
basic recruiter course
BRC
quality
Marine Corps recruiting command
MCRC
USMC
in-group theory
recruiting substation
RSS
DOD Enlistment Standards
JEPES
junior enlisted performance evaluation score
Marine Corps
enlistee
recruiter
recruiting assignment
special duty assignment
SDA
HSST
MMEA-25
basic recruiter course
BRC
quality
Marine Corps recruiting command
MCRC
USMC
in-group theory
recruiting substation
RSS
DOD Enlistment Standards
JEPES
junior enlisted performance evaluation score
Advisors
Ahn, Sae Young
Date of Issue
2021-03
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
In recruiting, the phrase “you recruit who you are” describes a presumed relationship—recruiters attract and enlist individuals who are similar to themselves or within their in-group. This research evaluates the correlation of high-quality recruiters on high-quality enlistees. For the 264,681 recruiter-enlistee pairs from 2011 to 2019, quality is defined and determined for both recruiters and enlistees with five metrics using DOD enlistment standards and Marine Corps promotion and retention standards. I use linear probability models with RSS fixed effects and year fixed effects to hold constant market conditions and variations across years. Based on the five metrics, I find that high-quality recruiters have a consistently positive estimated effect on high-quality enlistees across all metrics with several effects statistically significant. I surmise that, by determining which Marines are high-quality prior to their assignment to recruiting, the Marine Corps may affect the quality of the enlistees at accession. Because force design necessitates higher-quality accessions, this thesis therefore recommends that the Marine Corps consider sending more high-quality Marines to recruiting duty to potentially improve the quality of the warfighting organization. Conversely, if the Marine Corps does not prioritize and send high-quality Marines to recruiting duty, then the Marine Corps may pay the price with lower quality enlistees.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Graduate School of Defense Management (GSDM)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.