Amphibious and special operations in the Aegean Sea 1943-1945 : operational effectiveness and strategic implications

Abstract

The Aegean sea during the Second World War drew the attention of both the Allies and the Axis. The Italian occupation of the Dodecanese islands, which are in the southeastern perimeter of the Aegean was sought to be eliminated by the British from the early stages of the war for operational reasons as well as a bait for bringing Turkey into the war in the Allied side. For various reasons those plans were never implemented when in 1943 the Aegean became part of the Anglo-American controversy over the second front. For the British the Italian armistice provided a window of opportunity to thrust through the Aegean to the Balkans. The Americans firmly denied the British peripheral strategy but even without American aid the British proceeded and set foothold to the Aegean. Under such circumstances the Germans in the subsequent operations for Kos and Leros defeated them. However, they were more fortunate in conducting special operations in the Aegean, indeed a piratical war, from 1944 to the end of the war. This thesis follows the main events that affected the Aegean sea in the war, stressing on issues of inter-allied relations, peripheral strategy, tactical solutions to strategic problems and special operations.