Identification of causes and analysis of techniques for reducing delinquent deliveries in Department of Defense production contracts
Loading...
Authors
Dunbar, Glen Berry, III
Subjects
Delinquent deliveries
Schedule incentives
Late deliveries
Schedule changes
Schedule incentives
Late deliveries
Schedule changes
Advisors
Lamm, David V.
Date of Issue
1980-12
Date
December 1980
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
Approximately one in four Department of Defense production contracts are being carried in a delinquent status. These late deliveries have a value of several billion dollars, and eighty percent of the delinquent contracts are over ninety days late. The impact of these last deliveries affects many military organizations in a variety of ways. The causes of delinquency stem from actions of the Government and of the contractor. The Government attempts to use a number of incentives to motivate the contractor to provide timely delivery of the required items. It also utilizes a variety of procedures in an attempt to control and reduce the number of delinquent contracts. Yet a significant portion of the contracts are delinquent. The objective of this research effort was to provide a survey study of the delinquency problem, with a particular view of stimulating further in-depth research into its various aspects.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Administrative Sciences
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.