Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals

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Authors
Eggleston, Karen
Shen, Yu-Chu
Subjects
Soft budget constraints
Ownership
Health care
For-profit
Hospital quality
Advisors
Date of Issue
2011-01
Date
Publisher
Elsevier B.V.
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Abstract
Consistent with the property rights theory of ownership incorporating soft budget constraints (SBCs), we find that controlling for SBCs, for-profit hospitals drop safety-net services more often and exhibit higher mortality rates, suggesting aggressive cost control that damages non-contractible quality.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.016
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10945/57086
Series/Report No
Department
Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
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NPS Report Number
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Format
5 p.
Citation
Eggleston, Karen, and Yu-Chu Shen. "Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals." Economics Letters 110.1 (2011): 7-11.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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