Performance Measurement in Military Operations: Information versus Incentives
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Authors
Blanken, Leo J.
Lepore, Jason J.
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2012-11-12
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Abstract
We explore the impact of success measurement on military organizations. In particular,
we develop a model to understand how imperfect measures of success may have deleterious
externalities by creating unintended incentive structures for an agent. We show that the
informational properties of the measurements are based on how the measure di¤ers from
operational success while the incentive properties of the measurement are based on di¤er-
ences in the marginal sensitivity of both the measure and operational success. Further, we
show that undervaluing incentive properties of measurement will lead to systematic posi-
tive bias of information. We use the examples of the Second World War and the Vietnam
War to illustrate variation in the di¢ culty of measurement from conventional warfare to
counterinsurgency. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our analysis to the current con ict
in Afghanistan.
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Article
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Defense Analysis (DA)
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.