A study of covert channels in a trusted UNIX system
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Authors
DeJong, Ronald Johannes
Subjects
Advisors
Irvine, Cynthia E.
Shimeall, Timothy J.
Date of Issue
1995-03
Date
March 1995
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
Analysis and identification of potential channels for illicit information flow is not required for Class Bi trusted systems such as the Sun Microsystems Trusted Solaris 1.1 trusted computing base. When used in a multilevel context such channels would present a risk to data security. The problem addressed by this thesis is the identification of covert channels in Trusted Solaris and the determination if their exploitation can be detected using mechanisms provided to the security administrator. The approach taken to address this problem was to identify covert storage channels in the form of observable effects and exceptions of sharing internal databases by subjects at differing access classes. Software was developed to exploit the identified covert channels using a method requiring detailed specifications prior to the creation of code. Audit trails were obtained to evaluate the efficacy of audit in detecting active covert channel exploitation.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Computer Science
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
NA
Format
90 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.