Success and Failure in Doctrinal Innovation A Comparison of the U.S. Army Medical Department and Logistics Branch, 1990 2010
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Authors
Wekell, Douglas P.
Subjects
logistics
medical
BSB
BSMC
support battalion
military innovation
combat brigade
sustainment
military adaptation
doctrine
U.S. Army
ambulance
Stryker
medical
BSB
BSMC
support battalion
military innovation
combat brigade
sustainment
military adaptation
doctrine
U.S. Army
ambulance
Stryker
Advisors
Jaskoski, Maiah
Date of Issue
2012-03
Date
Mar-12
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
In the latter half of this decade, the U.S. Army has been engaged in persistent asymmetric warfare. During this period, army organizations have varied in the degree to which they have innovated doctrinally and technologically to confront this new reality. At the broadest level, the army has innovated considerably. However, at the combat brigade level, we observe variation across medical and logistics units, critical for providing support for combat operations. This thesis explains this variation. Several authors propose that units learn and innovate primarily during wartime or peacetime, and they do so from either a top-down or bottom-up methodology. Yet, such methods of learning do not adequately explain variations between respective levels of innovation in which logistics forces within combat brigades have seemingly adapted more rapidly than their medical counterparts. This thesis suggests that another factor, organizational complexity, explains why the brigade support medical company has not adapted as rapidly as its logistics counterparts within the support battalion (BSB) structure.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Security Studies
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.