An analysis of the financial incentives provided by a capitation-based resource allocation system within the Military Medical Department
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Authors
Nudd, Lorraine E.
Subjects
Capitation budgeting
Managed health care
Health care costs
Cost containment
Health care resource allocation systems
Incentives
Managed health care
Health care costs
Cost containment
Health care resource allocation systems
Incentives
Advisors
Gates, William R.
Orloff, Kenneth L.
Date of Issue
1993-12
Date
December 1993
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
This thesis analyzes whether a capitation-based resource allocation system will provide the incentives necessary to pursue or provide quality, cost- effective care within the Military Medical Department. To answer this question, capitation budgeting and its salient characteristics were defined. Then, the risks and incentives associated with capitation budgeting were compared against other budgetary methods. Subsequently, the civilian sector's experience with prepaid, managed care plans was analyzed, focusing on the incentives to the various health care players. It also questioned whether the quality of care has been effected. Next, the study drew on civilian sector experience to evaluate the potential impact of incentives on various players in the Military Health Services System. The study concludes that a capitation-based resource allocation system will provide the various players in the military health care arena with the proper incentives to provide quality, cost-effective care.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Department of Administrative Sciences
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
97 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.