A proposal to change the Federal Acquisition Regulation : recognizing the award fee incentive in fixed-price contracts
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Authors
Francom, Gerald Lee
Subjects
fixed price award fee
award fee
incentives
award fee
incentives
Advisors
Hart, E. Neil
Date of Issue
1989-06
Date
June 1989
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
The award fee is a unique incentive structure that provides the Government with a method of subjective, after-the-fact, evaluation of contractor performance and affords the Government additional flexibility to reward a contractor for above average performance. Additionally, the award fee incentive is not subject to the Disputes clause of a contract. Use of the award fee has proven to enhance Government to contractor communication and improve contractor performance in areas of quality, production management, ingenuity, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness.. The award fee incentive is recognized in the Federal Acquisition Regulation only under cost-reimbursement contracts. Limiting the use of the award fee to cost-reimbursement contracts. Limiting the use of the award fee to cost-reimbursement contracts restricts the Government's ability to derive the full benefits of the award fee incentive. In order to obtain the full benefit of the award fee, its use in fixed-price contracts should be sanctioned by recognizing it as specific contract forms in both Fixed-price and Cost-reimbursement contracting.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Administrative Sciences
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
74 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.