Alternatives to retaliation in response to state sponsored terrorist attacks

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Authors
Evans, Paul James
Subjects
Secret coalitions
terrorism
noncooperative games
security economics
Advisors
Owen, Guillermo
Date of Issue
2014-06
Date
Jun-14
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
We consider a game played between a state sponsor of international terrorism, a terrorist organization and the victim of a terrorist attack. The state sponsor wishes to inflict as much damage to the victim as possible without risking retaliation. The victim state wishes to end these attacks as soon as possible, through non-retaliatory means if possible in order to avoid the penalty associated with retaliation. In this thesis we compare and contrast the victim strategies of buyout, political attrition, and espionage tactics in an effort to maximize the profit of the victim and end the game without retaliation.
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Thesis
Description
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10945/42620
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Department
Applied Mathematics
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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