JUS IN BELLO IN THE ERA OF DRONE WARFARE: DISCRIMINATION, PROPORTIONALITY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREAT POWER COMPETITION
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Authors
Collazzo, Amanda L.
Subjects
discrimination
drone
Global War on Terror
Great Power Competition
Just War Theory
jus in bello
legitimate target
proportionality
Russia
Ukraine
unmanned aerial systems
drone
Global War on Terror
Great Power Competition
Just War Theory
jus in bello
legitimate target
proportionality
Russia
Ukraine
unmanned aerial systems
Advisors
Strawser, Bradley J.
Volpe, Tristan
Date of Issue
2025-03
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The rise of unmanned aerial systems has reshaped the ethical and operational environment of warfare. This thesis examines how the historical use of sophisticated and unsophisticated UAS, and adherence to jus in bello principles, informs their role in Great Power Competition, particularly against China. Through case studies of the Global War on Terror and the Ukraine–Russia conflict, it analyzes the application of discrimination and proportionality and how UAS influence future deterrence and engagement strategies. The GWOT study investigates how sophisticated systems enabled ISR and precision strikes in permissive environments against non-state actors. In contrast, the Ukraine–Russia study highlights the disruptive power of low-cost, commercial drones in contested battlespaces. These cases assess jus in bello adherence and inform recommendations for drone warfare in a future conflict with China, where advanced anti-access/area denial systems present major challenges. This study examines the challenges of UAS integration in contested environments with advanced anti-access/area denial systems. It recommends using sophisticated UAS for ISR and precision strikes while deploying unsophisticated drones for swarming and attrition. The research concludes with UAS development strategies focused on technological innovation, decentralized control, while adhering to jus in bello principles to ensure effectiveness, deterrence while minimizing escalation risks in Great Power conflict.
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Thesis
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Distribution Statement
Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.