Lessons not learned: the rekindling of Thailand's Pattani problem

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dc.contributor.advisorCroissant, Aurel
dc.contributor.advisorNasr, Vali
dc.contributor.authorPojar, Daniel J., Jr.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of National Security Affairs
dc.dateMarch 2005
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:34:34Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:34:34Z
dc.date.issued2005-03
dc.description.abstractThis thesis explores the ongoing Malay-Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand. In particular, it argues that historically-rooted structural factors, to include relative economic deprivation, limited political integration, and struggle for the maintenance of ethnic-religious identity, are at the root of this insurgency. The year 2001 produced two catalysts for the renewal of this insurgency, one internal and one external. The internal catalyst was a newly elected suppressive government regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party. The external catalyst was the growing, increasingly radicalized Islamist movement, largely defined through terrorist violence, that expressed itself in the 9/11 attacks. The combination of these has produced rekindled secessionist violence of a previously unknown level in the Thai provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala. Given the deeply ingrained structural cause of this insurgency, as well as a government administration whose policies and conflict mismanagement continually fuels the violence, the prospect for conflict resolution is not promising. Nonetheless, it remains in the best interests of the United States that this conflict is soon resolved. Should the insurgency continue growing, the situation may reach a point of drastic consequences for Thailand as well as the United States.en_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
dc.description.serviceCaptain, United States Air Forceen_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/lessonsnotlearne109452236
dc.format.extentxii, 99 p. : col. ill., col. mapsen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/2236
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.authorInsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.authorIslamismen_US
dc.subject.authorMalayen_US
dc.subject.authorMuslimen_US
dc.subject.authorNarathiwaten_US
dc.subject.authorPattanien_US
dc.subject.authorSecessionismen_US
dc.subject.authorSeparatismen_US
dc.subject.authorSouthern Thailanden_US
dc.subject.authorTerrorismen_US
dc.subject.authorThailanden_US
dc.subject.authorThai Rak Thaien_US
dc.subject.authorThaksinen_US
dc.subject.authorYalaen_US
dc.subject.lcshInsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.lcshThailanden_US
dc.subject.lcshMuslimsen_US
dc.subject.lcshSeparatistsen_US
dc.subject.lcshSecessionen_US
dc.titleLessons not learned: the rekindling of Thailand's Pattani problemen_US
dc.title.alternativeThailand's Pattani problemen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineNational Security Affairsen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameM.A. in National Security Affairsen_US
etd.verifiednoen_US
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