From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq
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Authors
Sepp, Kalenv
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2007
Date
2007
Publisher
Routledge
Language
Abstract
This article recounts the initial difficulties of the US occupation of Iraq that enabled the growth and maturation of the Iraqi insurgency. The focus will be on how the US military adapted, while in combat, to a situation for which its prior training and doctrinal focus had left it ill prepared. The article will explain the challenges faced by military leaders to move from a hierarchical, cold war-designed approach to warfare, to a more adaptive, decentralised mode of operations that requires distributed authority and decision making. The story will be told from the perspective of two strategic planners who helped shape the campaign plan for the coalition forces in Iraq, including the challenges they encountered when attempting to unify all elements of US national power against the Iraqi insurgency.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10,1080/01436590601153606
Series/Report No
Department
Defense Analysis (DA)
Organization
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NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
14 p.
Citation
Sepp, Kalev I. "From ‘shock and awe’to ‘hearts and minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq." Third World Quarterly 28.2 (2007): 217-230.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.