Competition and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game: A Field Experiment
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Authors
Cunha, Jesse M.
Augenblick, Ned
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Date of Issue
2012-07
Date
July 2012 (Revisions requested: Economic Inquiry)
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Abstract
We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions
in a field experiment. 10,000 potential political donors received
solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing
party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment),
or no past contribution information (control). Contribution rates in the competitive,
cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%,
respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of
contributions in the competitive treatment first order stochastically dominates
that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative
treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary
reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at
twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than
cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in intergroup public
good settings.
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Description
Working paper
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Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.