THE 2003 OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE-DECISION-MAKER RELATIONSHIP

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Authors
Galston, Arielle L.
Subjects
intelligence-decision-maker relationship
intelligence failure
intelligence success
Iraq
Ba'th
Saddam Hussein
Iraq War
Advisors
Dahl, Erik J.
Date of Issue
2024-03
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
In March 2003, coalition forces invaded Iraq, overthrew the Ba’athist regime, and removed Saddam Hussein. Rather than quickly withdrawing its forces as planned, the United States became entangled for two decades as identity-based violence surged and Iraqi institutions dissolved. This thesis investigates how decision-makers failed to anticipate and plan for the disintegration of Iraqi society and institutions, questioning whether the root cause stemmed from intelligence failures. By examining pre-war intelligence reports and military plans, as well as post-conflict decision-making, this thesis finds that while intelligence gaps existed, the larger problem was the failure of intelligence to drive operations. This failure reflected shortcomings in the relationship between the intelligence personnel and decision-makers, which contributed to an environment where decision-makers made key plans and decisions despite intelligence gaps and contrary to intelligence reporting. The post-war conditions in Iraq demonstrate the disastrous consequences when decision-makers disregard intelligence and when intelligence personnel fail to persuade them to listen.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
NPS Outstanding Theses and Dissertations
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
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Citation
Distribution Statement
Distribution Statement A. Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.