THE 2003 OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE-DECISION-MAKER RELATIONSHIP

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorDahl, Erik J.
dc.contributor.authorGalston, Arielle L.
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.contributor.secondreaderHelfont, Samuel R.
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-23T20:13:49Z
dc.date.available2024-04-23T20:13:49Z
dc.date.issued2024-03
dc.description.abstractIn March 2003, coalition forces invaded Iraq, overthrew the Ba’athist regime, and removed Saddam Hussein. Rather than quickly withdrawing its forces as planned, the United States became entangled for two decades as identity-based violence surged and Iraqi institutions dissolved. This thesis investigates how decision-makers failed to anticipate and plan for the disintegration of Iraqi society and institutions, questioning whether the root cause stemmed from intelligence failures. By examining pre-war intelligence reports and military plans, as well as post-conflict decision-making, this thesis finds that while intelligence gaps existed, the larger problem was the failure of intelligence to drive operations. This failure reflected shortcomings in the relationship between the intelligence personnel and decision-makers, which contributed to an environment where decision-makers made key plans and decisions despite intelligence gaps and contrary to intelligence reporting. The post-war conditions in Iraq demonstrate the disastrous consequences when decision-makers disregard intelligence and when intelligence personnel fail to persuade them to listen.en_US
dc.description.distributionstatementDistribution Statement A. Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.en_US
dc.description.recognitionOutstanding Thesisen_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant, United States Navyen_US
dc.identifier.curriculumcode681, Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa
dc.identifier.thesisid39079
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/72705
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNPS Outstanding Theses and Dissertations
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence-decision-maker relationshipen_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence failureen_US
dc.subject.authorintelligence successen_US
dc.subject.authorIraqen_US
dc.subject.authorBa'then_US
dc.subject.authorSaddam Husseinen_US
dc.subject.authorIraq Waren_US
dc.titleTHE 2003 OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE-DECISION-MAKER RELATIONSHIPen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Middle East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa)en_US
relation.isSeriesOfPublicationc5e66392-520c-4aaf-9b4f-370ce82b601f
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc5e66392-520c-4aaf-9b4f-370ce82b601f
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
24Mar_Galston_Arielle.pdf
Size:
2.75 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
Theses