An analysis of the Material Returns Program

Abstract

The volume of excess material is growing in virtually all of the Armed Services. A portion of this is 'invisible' to the supply system and other potential users because it is still in the hands of the end-user. The management problem created by 'holding' excess maybe due to disincentives for operational units to return material. This results from the complexity of the Material Returns Program and historically low rate of return experienced by many of the operational units. This thesis evaluates the Material Returns Program from a fleet perspective, concentrating on documented issues and experiences. Results indicate that acceptable changes can be implemented that will provide the incentive for end-users to return excess material to the supply system. The procurement policy of the Department of Defense (DOD) has long focused on providing the operational forces with state of the art technology. The intent of the policy is to provide our 'fighting forces' with a competitive edge in combat scenarios. However, this policy is not without its drawbacks. As a weapon system is replaced by a newer model, the older model, along with the repair part support, becomes 'excess'. The volume of excess material is growing in virtually all of the armed services.