My Neighbor’s Cattle: Strategic Behavior in a Spatial-dynamic Model with an Invasive Weed
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Authors
Chermak, J.M.
Grimsrud, K.M.
Krause, K.
Thacher, J.A.
Schimmelpfenning, D.
Hansen, J.K.
Subjects
renewable resources
externalities
dynamic games
invasive species
simulation
externalities
dynamic games
invasive species
simulation
Advisors
Date of Issue
2010
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Abstract
We consider optimal behavior in a class of spatial-dynamic economic problems related to a
negative externality with stock effects, via the development of a dynamic, non-cooperative game.
Feedback Nash equilibrium response functions are parameterized based on an invasive weed
found on western US cattle ranches. Simulations illustrate trade-offs between increasing costs of
management efforts, the invasives’ impact on productivity and temporal growth impacts, when
another agent’s effort and infestation levels are considered. Symmetric and asymmetric cases as
well as the socially optimal and second-best alternatives are considered. Optimal strategies are
often case specific, exemplifying the complexity of management.
Type
Working Paper
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Funder
This research is funded in part by the USDA PREISM competitive grant program (Grant 43- 3AEM-5-80065). The views expressed are not necessarily those of the USDA.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.