Defender - Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism
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Authors
Garcia, J.B.
von Winterfeldt, Detlof
Subjects
Decision theory
defender–attacker decisions
game theory
defender–attacker decisions
game theory
Advisors
Date of Issue
2016-04
Date
Publisher
Language
Abstract
We propose a methodology, called defender–attacker decision tree analysis, to evaluate defensive actions against terrorist attacks in a dynamic and hostile environment. Like most game‐theoretic formulations of this problem, we assume that the defenders act rationally by maximizing their expected utility or minimizing their expected costs. However, we do not assume that attackers maximize their expected utilities. Instead, we encode the defender's limited knowledge about the attacker's motivations and capabilities as a conditional probability distribution over the attacker's decisions. We apply this methodology to the problem of defending against possible terrorist attacks on commercial airplanes, using one of three weapons: infrared‐guided MANPADS (man‐portable air defense systems), laser‐guided MANPADS, or visually targeted RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). We also evaluate three countermeasures against these weapons: DIRCMs (directional infrared countermeasures), perimeter control around the airport, and hardening airplanes. The model includes deterrence effects, the effectiveness of the countermeasures, and the substitution of weapons and targets once a specific countermeasure is selected. It also includes a second stage of defensive decisions after an attack occurs. Key findings are: (1) due to the high cost of the countermeasures, not implementing countermeasures is the preferred defensive alternative for a large range of parameters; (2) if the probability of an attack and the associated consequences are large, a combination of DIRCMs and ground perimeter control are preferred over any single countermeasure.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/risa.12574
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
National Science Foundation
National Science Foundation
Funder
National Science Foundation SES-1314644
University of Southern California (USC) 2010-ST- 061-RE0001
University of Southern California (USC) 2010-ST- 061-RE0001
Format
14 p.
Citation
Garcia, Ryan JB, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. "Defender–attacker decision tree analysis to combat terrorism." Risk Analysis 36.12 (2016): 2258-2271.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.