Some evidence of congressional political markets in DOD personnel allocations across states
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Authors
Stroup, Michael D.
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Advisors
Date of Issue
1998
Date
1998
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Abstract
An empirical analysis of the distribution of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel
(both military and civilian) across states is developed with a commonly used Public
Choice model of resource allocation in a legislative setting. The model specification employs
Congressional seniority, Congressional committee representation, Presidential electoral votes,
and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of
DOD personnel across states over time. The empirical analysis is performed over the last
three decades, and the results indicate that this particular Public Choice legislative model
performs well in explaining the variation in DOD personnel allocations across states. The
results also provide some limited evidence of a possible political market between the states
for DOD personnel allocations. This analysis has implications for future testing of whether
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (established in 1988 under President Reagan),
and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 1990 (under President Bush)
were effective in significantly decreasing the legislative politics involved in the selection and
approval process for base closure and realignment.
Type
Article
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Citation
Public Choice, Vol. 94, pp. 241–254, 1998
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.