Failure in Afghanistan: How It Happened and What It Means
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Authors
Zinni, Anthony C.
Augier, Mie
Barrett, Sean F.X.
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2022
Date
Spring 2022
Publisher
Villanova University
Language
Abstract
We consider some dimensions of basic strategy and strategic thinking and use the Afghan case to identify and discuss a few pitfalls—both conceptual and practical—in the United States’ thinking regarding, and practice of, strategy and leadership over the past two decades. The Afghan case highlights the perils of intervening militarily with no understanding of the strategic environment and no strategic direction, compounded by constant turnover in leadership, overly optimistic planning, and mistaken metrics that oftentimes measured inconsequential activities to demonstrate "progress."
Type
Article
Description
17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under temporary embargo.
Series/Report No
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
U.S. Government affiliation is unstated in article text.
Format
21 p.
Citation
Zinni, Anthony C.; Augier, Mie, and Sean FX Barrett. "Failure in Afghanistan: How It Happened and What It Means." Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 45, No. 3, Spring 2022, pp. 30-50.