Data-Driven Enlisted Decision Making: A Report on the Effectiveness of Selective Retention Bonuses

Abstract

In Talent Management 2030, the Commandant outlines his plan to recalibrate enlisted personnel management in the Marine Corps from one of “recruit and replace” to an “invest and retain” model. Central to this strategy is the offering of bonuses of various kinds to encourage the reenlistment of first-term (FTAP) Marines, including Selected Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) that differentially target occupational specialties and pay grades. Using USMC manpower data covering fiscal years 2015 to 2020, we examine the extent to which the amounts of bonuses offered increase the likelihood that a “high quality” first-term Marine will reenlist. Although evidence of a positive effect is found by examining a cohort of first-term Marines who score highly on two components of the tier score, attributing effects due to the offering of bonuses is challenging due to the likely existence of confounding factors. Separate examination of three infantry specialties (Rifleman, Machine Gunner, and Mortarman) does not find conclusive evidence that reenlistment rates respond positively to the amounts of bonuses offered. A “menu of contracts” approach as an alternative to the SRB is found not to be feasible due to the lack of quality information and heterogeneity of the FTAP population within occupational specialties and paygrades.