A principal-agent perspective on counterinsurgency situations
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Authors
Perez Duenas, Federico S.
Subjects
Advisors
Szechtman, Roberto
Date of Issue
2011-06
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The successful conclusion to the war in Afghanistan necessitates an array of solutions that includes non-kinetic actions. In particular, there is growing interest in having the local population take control of the regional security, providing protection from external threats as well as internal sources of violence. In this thesis, the principal-agent paradigm is used to model the relationship between coalition forces (principal) and local tribes (agents).These relationships are affected by the lack of alignment of interests of the principal and the agents. To achieve the desired alignment, the principal must provide incentives to the agents. Two scenarios are considered: The simplest where the agents do not have private information and their actions can be verified. This scenario is used to determine a baseline for the transfers offered by the principal. The second- and more realistic- scenario captures the principal's lack of knowledge about the actions taken by the agents. The last model provides qualitative insights about the cost to the principal due to unknown information.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Operations Research
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xvi, 43 p. : col. map ;
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.