Triggers of Chinese economic coercion
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Authors
Dundon, Jeffrey R., Jr.
Subjects
China
Japan
Philippines
economic statecraft
asymmetric interdependence
sanctions
rare earths
Senkaku Islands
East China Sea
Scarborough Shoal
Dalai Lama
South China Sea
Japan
Philippines
economic statecraft
asymmetric interdependence
sanctions
rare earths
Senkaku Islands
East China Sea
Scarborough Shoal
Dalai Lama
South China Sea
Advisors
Glosny, Michael A.
Date of Issue
2014-09
Date
Sep-14
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This study considers the triggers that may cause China to use economic coercion in bilateral state disputes. The literature reviewed shows that economic statecraft and coercion is a viable policy tool for shaping an opposing state’s behavior and the degree to which a state holds an asymmetrical economic advantage influences its ability to wield this tool. China’s rising power has made the study and understanding of the conditions under which China will utilize economic coercion an imperative as more states become vulnerable to it. China has already revealed that it is willing to shape state behavior through economic carrots and sticks. As demonstrated by the case studies explored in this thesis, China uses economic coercion to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty and its understanding of the status quo. Where it holds an economically asymmetrical advantage, China has targeted specific sectors for coercion as a way to signal resolve. As Chinese economic power continues to rise relative to regional neighbors and the U.S., the feasibility of using economic coercion also increases, making the future employment of economic coercion likely wherever China perceives a threat to its interests that is cannot be solved with its increasing military might.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs
Organization
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NPS Report Number
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Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.