Venezuela's corruption on the rise: fourteen years of Chávismo

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Authors
Mercado, Frances V.
Subjects
Venezuela
Mexico
Brazil
Hugo Chávez
corruption
Resource Curse
oil
populism
anti-corruption
state center anti-corruption
Advisors
Nieto-Gómez, Rodrigo
Date of Issue
2016-09
Date
Sep-16
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This thesis seeks to answer two related questions regarding corruption and Chávismo. First, what factors contributed to the rise in Venezuela's Corruption Perception Index from 2000–2014? Second, what does Venezuela need to do to reverse that trend? The thesis examines Hugo Chávez's populist policies as well as two leading factors for the rise of corruption—weak governance and oil over-dependence practices—and analyzes the Resource Curse theory and Cháveznomics. Chávez's populist policies created neo-patrimonial networks, increasing the intensity of corrupt practices between specific sectors of citizens and political elites. Cháveznomics policies also created a mismanagement of windfall oil rents, establishing a Rentier State for Venezuela. The Rentier State established corrupt patronage networks with state industries that remained intact under the high oil prices during 2000–2014. The thesis also conducts theoretical analysis of anti-corruption methods while considering Venezuelan societal elements of culture, political will, and international integration. State-center anti-corruption strategies prove to be an appropriate method for Venezuela's societal elements and unique corruption environment. The proposed state-center strategies incorporate a three-prong anti-corruption approach, including political, economic, and social accountability reforms with market-friendly social democratic policies that build political will and civic engagement.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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