The Mathematics of Terrorism Risk: Equilibrium Force Allocations and Attack Probabilities
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Authors
Gudmundsson, Bruce I.
Powers, Michael R.
Subjects
Terrorism risk
force allocations
attack probabilities
game theory
Lanchester equations
power-law distributions.
force allocations
attack probabilities
game theory
Lanchester equations
power-law distributions.
Advisors
Date of Issue
2008-06
Date
5-7 June 2008
Publisher
Language
Abstract
We model the struggle between terrorist and conventional forces as a Colonel Blotto game, replacing Powers and Shen’s (2006) mathematical expression for the probability of target destruction by a more rigorously derived approximation from a diffusion-based Lanchester analysis. We then use the resulting equilibrium solutions for force allocations and attack probabilities to make inferences about terrorist attackers and government defenders that are roughly consistent with empirical findings. Our analysis reveals that the loss function of a government/society plays a central role in determining the types of targets likely to be attacked by terrorists in “peacetime” and “wartime”, leading to a much more frequent selection of “trophy” targets in peacetime.
Type
Conference Paper
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
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Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.