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Why Defeating Insurgencies is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations - A Best Case Scenario

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Authors
Kress, Moshe
Szechtman, Roberto
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Date of Issue
2009
Date
May - June 2009
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Abstract
In insurgency situations, the government-organized force is confronted by a small guerrilla group that is dispersed in the general population with no or a very small signature. Effective counterinsurgency operations require good intelligence. Absent intelligence, not only might the insurgents escape unharmed and continue their violent actions, but collateral damage caused to the general population from poor targeting may generate adverse response against the government and create popular support for the insurgents, which may result in higher recruitment to the insurgency. We model the dynamic relations among intelligence, collateral casualties in the population, attrition, recruitment to the insurgency, and reinforcement to the government force. Even under best-case assumptions, we show that the government cannot totally eradicate the insurgency by force. The best it can do is contain it at a certain fixed level.
Type
Article
Description
Operations Research, V. 57, pp 578-585.
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Operations Research (OR)
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Citation
2009 “Why Defeating Insurgencies is Hard: The Effect of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations -- A Best Case Scenario”, (with R. Szechtman), Operations Research, V. 57, pp 578-585.
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defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.
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