USING PARTNERED AND ALLIED CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE TO MAINTAIN PERSISTENT RECONNAISSANCE/COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

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dc.contributor.advisorMichael, James B.
dc.contributor.advisorShives, Timothy R.
dc.contributor.advisorHuntley, Wade L.
dc.contributor.authorRashley, Harrison C.
dc.contributor.departmentComputer Science (CS)
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-01T19:15:29Z
dc.date.available2024-11-01T19:15:29Z
dc.date.issued2024-09
dc.descriptionIncludes Supplementary Materialen_US
dc.description.abstractThe first island chain is a threat environment characterized by persistent and sophisticated cyber activities by state and non-state actors as well as strategic competition with China, North Korea, and Russia. To operate in these conditions the Marine Corps has proposed the Stand-in Force, a small, low-signature force establishing the forward edge of a partnered defense-in-depth in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of operations. This thesis examines the efficacy of utilizing partnered and allied cyber infrastructure to support persistent reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations by Stand-in Forces within contested maritime zones. It focuses on three key Indo-Pacific allies: Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Through a multi-case study, it examines each nation’s cyber command structure, defense network security, existing cyber agreements with the United States, and barriers to cooperation, congruently assessing their cyber capabilities and willingness to cooperate in cyberspace. The result is a summary of their ability to support the Stand-in Forces in defensive and offensive cyber operations, an analysis of current barriers, and the requirements of an ideally cyber-capable Stand-in Force. A classified supplemental summarizes sensitive additions to each study, as well as technologies the Stand-in Force might employ to accomplish their reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance mission in cyberspace.en_US
dc.description.distributionstatementDistribution Statement A. Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.en_US
dc.description.serviceCaptain, United States Marine Corpsen_US
dc.identifier.curriculumcode368, Computer Science
dc.identifier.thesisid40160
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/73360
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.authorcyberen_US
dc.subject.authorcyber reconnaissanceen_US
dc.subject.authorMarine Corpsen_US
dc.subject.authorStand-in Forceen_US
dc.subject.authoramphibious forceen_US
dc.subject.authorpartnersen_US
dc.subject.authoralliesen_US
dc.subject.authorpolicyen_US
dc.subject.authordoctrineen_US
dc.subject.authoroperationsen_US
dc.titleUSING PARTNERED AND ALLIED CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE TO MAINTAIN PERSISTENT RECONNAISSANCE/COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE FOR AMPHIBIOUS FORCESen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineComputer Scienceen_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Science in Computer Scienceen_US
relation.isDepartmentOfPublication67864e54-711d-4c0a-a6d4-439a011f2bd1
relation.isDepartmentOfPublication.latestForDiscovery67864e54-711d-4c0a-a6d4-439a011f2bd1
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