Analyzing the rationales behind Russia's intervention in Ukraine
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Authors
Thomas, Kevin T.
Subjects
neoclassical realism
prospect theory
rationality
hybrid warfare
Budapest Memorandum
Crimea annexation
EU association agreement
NATO expansion
Euromaidan
Yanukovych
post-Soviet identity
spheres of interest
Russo-Georgian war
Black Sea Fleet
oil and gas resources
Putin
Russian nationalism
domestic politics
color revolutions
Gazprom
gas wars
European gas dependence
nuclear messaging
foreign reserves
economic sanctions
prospect theory
rationality
hybrid warfare
Budapest Memorandum
Crimea annexation
EU association agreement
NATO expansion
Euromaidan
Yanukovych
post-Soviet identity
spheres of interest
Russo-Georgian war
Black Sea Fleet
oil and gas resources
Putin
Russian nationalism
domestic politics
color revolutions
Gazprom
gas wars
European gas dependence
nuclear messaging
foreign reserves
economic sanctions
Advisors
Yost, David S.
Date of Issue
2016-03
Date
Mar-16
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This thesis examines the rationales behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to intervene in Ukraine through the lenses of neoclassical realism and prospect theory. The risk-acceptant decision to employ hybrid warfare in Crimea was fundamentally due to Putin’s loss aversion. Since Putin frames his political decision-making reference point in the realm of losses, his decision sought to prevent the imminent losses of Ukraine’s Russian-oriented government, Russia’s influence in Ukraine, and Putin’s own political power at home. It also sought to somewhat recover from the catastrophic loss of the Soviet Union’s territorial possessions, population, and status. Putin exploited Western leaders’ naiveté and vulnerabilities to prepare a geopolitical landscape wherein Russia could act without incurring excessive costs. Emboldened by Russia’s large financial reserves and backed by Russia’s seemingly irrational threats of cutting off essential European gas supplies and launching nuclear attacks, Putin correctly anticipated a limited economic sanctions response and a negligible military response from the West. Putin’s decision furthered Russia’s interests by acquiring Crimea, the strategically indispensable port of Sevastopol, and vast Black Sea region resources. Such action also thwarted the expansion of Western institutions in Ukraine and incited fervent Russian ethno-nationalism, boosting Putin’s domestic approval ratings to an unprecedented level.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs
National Security Affairs
Organization
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NPS Report Number
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Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.