DESIGNED TO FAIL: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PRESIDENTIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

dc.contributor.advisorDarnton, Christopher N.
dc.contributor.advisorGiusti Rodriguez, Mariana
dc.contributor.authorSuyderhoud, Jacques A.
dc.contributor.departmentNational Security Affairs (NSA)
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-21T00:25:00Z
dc.date.available2020-08-21T00:25:00Z
dc.date.issued2020-06
dc.description.abstractOperating under the assumption that proportional representation (PR) systems strengthen rather than undermine democracies, scholars have largely ignored the question of how this particular system interacts with presidentialism to shape stability outcomes. This thesis challenges that understanding. It argues that presidentialism, in interaction with PR for legislative elections, reduces coalition-formation incentives and makes inter-branch conflict in Latin American democracies more likely. Through a cross-regional comparative analysis and case studies on the Chilean and Venezuelan democratic experiences, this thesis shows that presidential systems experience higher levels of conflict when not subject to the systematic coalition incentives regularly produced by parliamentary or plurality-presidential systems. It also indicates that institutional factors can shape governing coalitions, independent of traditional political divides. Without electoral incentives to coalesce policy visions before elections or institutional mechanisms to ensure the formation of a majority coalition after the election, PR-presidential systems often create a multiparty result that is especially prone to inter-branch conflict and political crisis.en_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release. distribution is unlimiteden_US
dc.description.serviceLieutenant Commander, United States Navyen_US
dc.identifier.thesisid32764
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/65450
dc.publisherMonterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.authorcoalitionsen_US
dc.subject.authorelectoral systemsen_US
dc.subject.authorLatin Americaen_US
dc.subject.authorinter-branch conflicten_US
dc.subject.authorChileen_US
dc.subject.authorVenezuelaen_US
dc.subject.authorpresidentialismen_US
dc.subject.authorproportional representationen_US
dc.subject.authorPRen_US
dc.subject.authorpluralityen_US
dc.subject.authorthird waveen_US
dc.subject.authordemocracyen_US
dc.titleDESIGNED TO FAIL: PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PRESIDENTIALISM IN LATIN AMERICAen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
etd.thesisdegree.disciplineSecurity Studies (Western Hemisphere)en_US
etd.thesisdegree.grantorNaval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
etd.thesisdegree.levelMastersen_US
etd.thesisdegree.nameMaster of Arts in Security Studies (Western Hemisphere)en_US
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