Long Range Fires in Degraded and Denied Environments
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Authors
Paulo, Eugene P.
Subjects
long-range fires
hypervelocity missile
denied and degraded environment
counter command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT)
hypervelocity missile
denied and degraded environment
counter command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT)
Advisors
Date of Issue
2022-10-05
Date
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
The employment of long-range fires is a high priority for the U.S. Navy, addressing the capability of forces to coordinate deep strike weapons that can be launched from an array of joint assets against critical enemy assets at sea or hardened facilities on land. Additionally, the long-range fires process must be resilient in a degraded or denied environment. However, coordinating long-range fires encompasses a complex set of actions to include target prioritization and development, command and control, tasking, kinetic and non-kinetic fires, battle damage assessment, rearming, and contested logistics. Our approach leverages recent Navy-sponsored research, simulation, and analysis to include projects involving joint fires within distributed maritime operations and feasibility of deploying hypersonic missiles on U.S. surface ships. We apply a similar approach here but augment it with a system of systems analysis of long-range fires in a degraded and denied environment as part of a timely and relevant joint operational scenario. We examine significant design decisions and operational parameters, as well as appropriate measures of effectiveness, in generating successful long-range fires through systems architecture development and simulation analysis. Based on the functional hierarchy and the primary variables, our simulation results show that the addition of decoys along with the long-range fire weapon salvo is more effective at successfully destroying the Red Force target compared to adding more weapons to the salvo. The decoys are capable of reducing the amount of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) degradation, which results in a higher probability of hit and kill for the Blue Force weapons. Additionally, considering the cost of decoys versus weapons used, including cruise missiles, sea-skimming missiles, and hypersonic missiles, it can be more cost effective to use more decoys with the weapons salvo than adding more long-range fire weapons to the salvo.
Type
Report
Description
NPS NRP Executive Summary
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
N2/N6 - Information Warfare
Funder
This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098).
Format
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.