Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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Authors
Owen, Guillermo
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Date
2009
Publisher
World Scientific
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Abstract
We develop a model of coalition formation based on personal proprieties among the players of an n-person game. Several examples are worked out in detail, showing that certain coalitions are much more stable than others, and /or much more likely to form than others. We also consider the dynamics of such coalition-formation. By a numerical example, we show that small changes in the initial conditions can lead to very different results in the coalitions formed in a given game.
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Article
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Department
Applied Mathematics
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Format
7 p.
Citation
Owen, G. 2009, "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions", International Game Theory Review, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 461--470.
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This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.