Securing Software Updates under Receiver Radio Frequency Geolocation Risk
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Authors
Hayden, Blake
Sweeney, Matthew
Hale, Britta
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2022-04-22
Date
2022-04-22
Publisher
Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
In the new, ever-changing cyber domain, it is crucial that the military establishes a method of delivering large data payloads to remote locations that minimizes radio frequency (RF) signature for receivers, thereby reducing the associated geolocation potential. This paper introduces three cryptographic protocols for different components of a delivery architecture for a large data payload from a trusted, back-end source to receivers: a low-response protocol for initial transmission and confirmation and two possible inter-unit distribution protocols with differing optimizations based on connectivity scenarios. All three protocols expressly aim to minimize the radio frequency (RF) footprint created on the receiver end. We provide security models and analyze the security protocols, and furthermore provide a worst-case example bound on RF footprint created at the receivers for each protocol, with variable inputs for data transmission size. These protocols introduce a means for accounting for both security (authentication) and safety (minimized RF footprint) in the delivery of critical data payloads to remote receivers.
Type
Article
Description
17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review.
Series/Report No
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Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
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Format
41 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.