Competition and cooperation in a public goods game: A field experiment
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Authors
Augenblick, Ned
Cunha, Jesse M.
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2014
Date
Publisher
Western Economic Association International
Language
Abstract
We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the compet- itive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12105
Series/Report No
Department
Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
George P. Shultz Fund and the B.F. Haley and E.S. Shaw Fellowship
Funder
Format
15 p.
Citation
Augenblick, Ned, and Jesse M. Cunha. "Competition and cooperation in a public goods game: A field experiment." Economic Inquiry 53.1 (2015): 574-588.
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.