Publication:
Explaining success and failure counterinsurgency in Malaya and India

dc.contributor.advisorJaskoski, Maiah
dc.contributor.authorBoyini, Deepak Aneel.
dc.contributor.corporateNaval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
dc.contributor.secondreaderChatterjee, Anshu.
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-14T17:43:59Z
dc.date.available2012-03-14T17:43:59Z
dc.date.issued2010-12
dc.description.abstractThe Maoist insurgency in India, also called Naxalism, has become a threat to internal security with ever-growing violence and attacks on security forces and civilians. With the increased numbers of cadres, improved weaponry, and guerilla tactics, the Maoists' challenge to the state stretches across 16 of India's 28 states, affecting its economic growth. Despite efforts by India's state and central governments, counterinsurgency against Naxalism has failed in majority of affected areas. With an aim of finding a model that could lead to success in countering the Maoist insurgency, this thesis seeks to explain counterinsurgency success and failure, using cross-national and sub-national comparisons. At the national level, the successful Malayan counterinsurgency approach by the British is juxtaposed against the largely failed attempts by the Indian central authorities to control Naxalism. The thesis finds that success is explained by a combination of enemy-centric and population-centric approaches whereas failure is explained by lack of balance between the two. At the state level within India, a comparison between the successful case of Andhra Pradesh and the failed case of Chhattisgarh reveals a similar pattern. Specifically, enemy-centric measures based on reliable intelligence, a capable force, and a unified command followed by population-centric aspects of winning hearts and minds, lead to success in countering insurgencies.en_US
dc.description.distributionstatementApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
dc.description.serviceIndian Navy authoren_US
dc.description.urihttp://archive.org/details/explainingsucces109455038
dc.format.extentxviii, 159 p. : maps. ;en_US
dc.identifier.oclc698377551
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/5038
dc.publisherMonterey, California. Naval Postgraduate Schoolen_US
dc.rightsThis publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.en_US
dc.subject.lcshCounterinsurgencyen_US
dc.subject.lcshInsurgencyen_US
dc.titleExplaining success and failure counterinsurgency in Malaya and Indiaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
etd.verifiednoen_US
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
10Dec_Boyini.pdf
Size:
874.57 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Collections