Bargaining tactics and strategy in a Government/Contractor bilateral monopoly
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Authors
Van Veen, Dennis Gerard.
Subjects
Bargaining theory
Bargaining
Negotiations
Strategy
Tactics
Bilateral monopoly
Sole source contracts
Purchasing
Bargaining
Negotiations
Strategy
Tactics
Bilateral monopoly
Sole source contracts
Purchasing
Advisors
Lamm, David V.
Date of Issue
1998-03-01
Date
March 1998
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to examine potential bargaining strategies and tactics which might be used to respond to an offer perceived as unfair or unreasonable from a sole source offeror. Initially, a sole source offeror normally has considerable bargaining leverage over the Government. Pricing data needed to properly evaluate the seller's quotation may be incomplete, inaccurate or unavailable. Urgent and compelling need may require accelerating the procurement process. Using bargaining theory and the classic economic paradigm of bilateral monopoly as a foundation for the research, potential bargaining strategies and tactics were evaluated through a survey of 62 Department of Defense contracting specialists. A primary conclusion of the research is that attaining a bargaining agreement that reflects a fair and reasonable price under bilateral monopoly conditions is not possible unless the Government possesses adequate information to accurately assess the fairness and reasonableness of the offered price.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Department of Systems Management
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
ix, 161 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.