The limits of Type D coercive diplomacy in Somalia
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Authors
Harrison, John C.
Subjects
Advisors
Moran, Daniel
Date of Issue
1995-12
Date
December 1995
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
This thesis argues that the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia in 1992-1994 represents an attempt to use coercive diplomacy to re-create the Somali state. It further argues that the pre-conditions for a successful use of coercive diplomacy existed initially during the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) phase, but they quickly disappeared during the expanded mission of United Nations Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This thesis proposes that UNITAF leadership were quite successful in accomplishing their limited objectives. Additionally, when UNOSOM II assumed the mission in Somalia, the expanded mandates and policies chosen by both the U.S. and the U.N. changed the conditions for success and led the UNOSOM II forces to war with members of the Somali militia.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
NA
Format
75 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.