Evaluating Choices on Cyber Operations and New Weapon Technologies
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Authors
Huntley, Wade L.
Subjects
Cyber Offense
Cyber Defense
Cyber Operations
Cyber Warfare
Cyber Strategy
DCO
OCO
Cognitive Warfare
Information Operations
Naval Operations
Multi-Domain Warfare
Offense-Defense Balance
Offense-Defense Advantage
Cyber Geography
Dual-Use
Zero-Day
Cyber Perishability
Cyber Obsolescence
Cyber Defense
Cyber Operations
Cyber Warfare
Cyber Strategy
DCO
OCO
Cognitive Warfare
Information Operations
Naval Operations
Multi-Domain Warfare
Offense-Defense Balance
Offense-Defense Advantage
Cyber Geography
Dual-Use
Zero-Day
Cyber Perishability
Cyber Obsolescence
Advisors
Date of Issue
2025-03-31
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This report provides the findings of an examination of how the distribution of offensive cyber operations (OCO) and defensive cyber operations (DCO) contributes to the achievement of strategic goals. Drawing on established theories of the relationship of offensive and defensive weaponry in terrestrial conflict domains, the examination develops a methodological framework to examine the relative contributions of OCO and DCO to offensive and defensive cyber strategies and overall multi-domain outcomes. The assessment in this report identifies challenges and opportunities in associating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities with appropriate offensive and defensive strategies. Some challenges are intrinsic to the dynamic effects of specific weapons technologies on conflict outcomes, while other challenges are specific to the conditions of the cyber domain. The report identifies principal complicating factors in associating OCO and DCO selections with strategic outcomes: • the dual-use and indistinguishable nature of some of the most sophisticated cyber weapons, • the opacity of operations incumbent to the cyber domain • the complexities and data acquisition impediments in calculating precise relative costs associated with developing and utilizing offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, • the information paucity exacerbation of motivated analytical biases, and • the sometimes inverted relationship of OCO and DCO to offensive and defensive strategies, respectively. These findings support the importance of developing a precise and empirical evaluation methodology associating objectives achievement in the distribution and balance of OCO and DCO missions to the underlying operational and strategic objectives of those missions. Such development will advance evaluation of U.S. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (FCC) / U.S. TENTH Fleet (C10F) choices on incorporation and utilization of cyber capabilities in naval operations.
Type
Report
Description
NPS NRP Executive Summary
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
N2/N6 - Information Warfare
Funder
This research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrp
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
Format
4 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.