BAD IDEA POORLY EXECUTED: A CASE STUDY OF THE DISINFORMATION GOVERNANCE BOARD

Abstract

The Department of Homeland Security's Disinformation Governance Board (DGB) was a short-lived yet highly controversial initiative that illustrates a fundamental paradox: government-led counter-disinformation efforts can weaken the very democratic institutions they aim to protect. This thesis challenges the prevailing narrative that the DGB's collapse was merely the result of poor execution. Instead, it argues the root causes of the board's failure were more fundamental, calling into question whether similar efforts could succeed, even with a better-executed public relations strategy.This thesis tells the story of the DGB's creation, the public backlash it prompted, and leadership's decision to terminate the DGB. The DGB's demise is attributed to a series of public relations failures, conceptual and design failures, and broader systemic failures. Among other things, the inherent difficulty of defining "disinformation" raised fears the DGB would be politically weaponized. This in turn fed a pre-existing democratic "death spiral" that increased the public's susceptibility to disinformation.This thesis concludes by discussing the limits of securitization and the need for a new counter-disinformation paradigm. Specifically, it argues policymakers must reframe the "disinformation problem" as a long-term social and emotional resilience issue rather than an information crisis, advocating for solutions that reduce threat perception and restore institutional trust.