Integrating monetary and non-monetary reenlistment incentives utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)
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Authors
Zimmerman, Brooke Maura
Subjects
Advisors
Gates, William R.
Coughlan, Peter J.
Date of Issue
2008-12
Date
Publisher
Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors by exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and weaknesses were explored. CRAM clearly outperformed the monetary and UIP auctions. Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 25 to 80% over monetary incentives alone. Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of CRAM. It was shown, for the sample used, that offering certain non-monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained. By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits, which suit them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while at the same time empowering its members.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
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NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
xviii, 179 p. : ill. (chiefly col.)
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.