Blame-proof policymaking: Congress and base closures

Authors
Wilson, Charles L.
Weingartner, James L.
Subjects
Congress
Base closures
Elections
Parochial imperative
Military facilities
Delegation of power
Executive and Legislative branches
Advisors
Stockton, Paul N.
Date of Issue
1993-12
Date
December 1993
Publisher
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Language
en_US
Abstract
In contrast to the current political science literature on Congress, this thesis argues that the reelectability of Congressmen is not damaged when military bases in their districts are closed. According to Mayhew, Lindsay, and other scholars, members of Congress must prevent their bases from being closed or face 'great electoral jeopardy.' Nevertheless, beginning in 1987, legislators created a process that was designed to facilitate base closures. Why would they engage in such apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict? After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992, which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis found that base closure has no effect on the reelectability of members of Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The success of this 'blame-proof' system has important implications for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and under what circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
National Security Affairs (NSA)
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funder
Format
137 p.
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.