THE INTERACTION OF NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL STRATEGIES

Abstract

North Korea has sought nuclear weapons because acquiring nuclear weapons can offset a state’s inferior power in conventional warfare. North Korea seems to expect "nuclear substitution," which is defined as a situation in which countries with nuclear capabilities enjoy a higher level of security capability than before nuclear development, while reducing the burden of conventional power construction. However, this does not appear applicable to the North. In other words, even if the North is able to acquire nuclear weapons, the burden of conventional power development is not reduced. To grasp the situation, Pakistan can anticipate the North's behavior because Pakistan has similar security situations as North Korea in several aspects. Pakistan has not reduced its conventional power construction since its nuclear armament. This suggests that nuclear substitution may be insufficient; thus, Pakistan is developing a conventional strategy in terms of “nuclear-conventional strategy interaction,” in which conventional forces play a pivotal role in implementing military strategies. This study supposes that the situation in North Korea is similar to that of Pakistan. North Korea could face a dilemma of additional costs for conventional power construction at a time when nuclear compensation is not as effective as expected. Therefore, this study focuses on why the North cannot expect nuclear substitution and which dilemmas are ahead for the North.