Dumping and Subsidy Cases at the ITC: Voting Discretion and Commissioner Attributes
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Authors
Brook, Douglas A.
Subjects
Advisors
Date of Issue
2005
Date
Publisher
Language
Abstract
In antidumping and countervailing duty cases, why do commissioners
of the International Trade Commission vote as they
do? Commissioners are presented with the same petitions, listen
to the same oral arguments, have access to the same economic
data, and operate under the same trade laws. Yet there
is variability in voting behavior. Political economy models have
left an incomplete understanding of ITC voting and recent literature
suggests there may be attributes of the commissioners that
explain their voting behavior. This study of votes on antidumping
and countervailing duty cases between 1992 and 1999 looks at
five such attributes: political party, party of the appointing president,
prior employment on Capitol Hill, profession as lawyers,
and prior employment in business and labor organizations. Applying
a statistical analysis reveals that, of these five variables, only
prior affiliation with business and labor organizations and political
party appear related to ITC Commissioners’voting patterns.
Type
Article
Description
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08853900500290731
Series/Report No
Department
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP)
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NPS Report Number
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Format
Citation
The International Trade Journal, Volume XIX, No. 4, Winter 20065, DOI: 10.1080/08853900500290731
Distribution Statement
Rights
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.