Air base defense different times call for different methods
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Authors
Ditlevson, Jeffery T.
Subjects
Advisors
Rasmussen, Maria
Date of Issue
2006-12
Date
Publisher
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
Language
Abstract
As the United States Air Force air base defense doctrine evolved over the years, implementation and execution errors were occasionally exploited by insurgent forces operating in the areas adjacent to U.S. occupied air bases. Executing unconventional attack methodologies, primarily via stand-off weapons, these insurgents were able to wreak havoc on U.S. and allied air bases, causing massive destruction and the loss of American lives. An examination of the literature from air base (ground) attacks in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar Towers indicated several problematic areas resonating in all three cases. These common areas include: inadequate intelligence (both organic and external), lack of proper focus on critical infrastructure and insufficient or absent force protection technologies. Many of today[alpha]s security experts are predicting future attacks on military infrastructure to include stateside and forwarddeployed air bases. Today[alpha]s slightly diverse, yet consistent insurgent enemy, with attack methodologies mirroring those of Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, remains a constant and formidable threat. As the Air Force moves forward with its newly implemented Integrated Base Defense doctrine, specific attention must be paid to improving upon the problem areas from the past. This thesis focuses on the specific problematic areas, and provides policy recommendations for force protection planners.
Type
Thesis
Description
Series/Report No
Department
Organization
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Identifiers
NPS Report Number
Sponsors
Funding
Format
xvi, 111 p. ;
Citation
Distribution Statement
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.